US cables from Kabul by Ambassador Eikenbery detail overwhelming Afghan corruption

This wikileaks stuff on Afghanistan is hard evidence that the US presence has led to a incredibly corrupt situation. Were it not for widespread public denial of the degree of badness of US "intelligence" agencies a huge amount of global evil could be avoided.
I recieved this by way of a listserve from Tacoma- Peaople For Peace, Justice and Healing: http://www.tacomapjh.org/
-Rick

[In its Friday edition, the *New York Times* series based on secret
U.S. diplomatic cables leaked to Wikileaks focused on Afghanistan. --
Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Dexter Filkins reported that they
show that Afghanistan is "a looking-glass land where bribery,
extortion, and embezzlement are the norm and the honest official is a
distinct outlier."[1] -- While corruption in Afghanistan is no news,
the Wikileaks trove "offers a fresh sense of its pervasive nature, its
overwhelming scale, and the dispiriting challenge it poses," Shane,
Mazzetti, and Filkins said. -- "The cables describe a country where
everything is for sale." -- "The widespread corruption is made
possible in part by a largely unregulated banking infrastructure and
the ancient hawala money transfer network that is the method of choice
for politicians, insurgents, and drug traffickers to move cash around
the Muslim world." -- The text of five cables signed by U.S.
Ambassador Eikenberry are posted on the *New York Times* exactly as
they appear on the Wikileaks site. -- The first states that "large
amounts of physical cash transit from Kabul to Dubai on a weekly,
monthly, and annual basis. . . . An official claiming first-hand
knowledge recently told the Treasury Attache some $75 million
transited through KIA bound for Dubai in one day during the month of
July. The primary currencies identified at the airport for these
three months include (in declining order): Saudi riyals, Euros, U.S.
dollars, and UAE dirhams. . . . According to our sources, established
couriers primarily use Pamir Airlines, which is owned by Kabul Bank
and influential Afghans such as Mahmood Karzai and Mohammad Fahim who
is President Hamid Karzai’s current vice-presidential running
mate."[2] -- "One experienced banker flatly said no legitimate
business person would keep significant sums of money in Afghanistan
right now given the overwhelming risks of doing so." -- A Feb. 7,
2010, cable (also by Ambassador Eikenberry) shows how the U.S. feels
obliged to turn a blind eye to the corruption of local officials.[3]
-- A Jan. 7, 2010, cable (also by Ambassador Eikenberry) describes
the persecution of an Afghan official who tried to stop corruption in
Kabul, persecution that was billed as part of an anti-corruption
campaign.[4] -- A Nov. 18, 2009, cable said that Afghan ministers
"are only thinking of dividing up the spoils rather than the quality
of government needed to tackle Afghanistan's problems."[5] --
Another Eikenberry cable written in October 2009 spoke of "wide-scale
illicit cash transfers for corrupt Afghan officials and . . . illicit
financial services for narco-traffickers, insurgents, and criminals
through an array of front companies in Afghanistan and the UAE" that
are provided by "Afghanistan's New Ansari hawala network."[6] --but
dozens more are available at the URL above. -- The *Times* gives no
precise information on these cables (thirty-six others from the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul have been published) and fails to provide a link to
them. -- (The Wikileaks material was available here late on Dec. 3.
[http://213.251.145.96/cablegate.html]) --Mark]

http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/10007/
or
http://tinyurl.com/2u2nqfh

1.

State's secrets

A cache of diplomatic cables provides a chronicle of the United
States' relations with the world

CABLES DEPICT AFGHAN GRAFT, STARTING AT THE TOP
By Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Dexter Filkins

New York Times
December 3, 2010 (posted Dec. 2)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/world/asia/03wikileaks-corruption.html

WASHINGTON -- From hundreds of diplomatic cables, Afghanistan emerges
as a looking-glass land where bribery, extortion and embezzlement are
the norm and the honest official is a distinct outlier.

Describing the likely lineup of Afghanistan’s new cabinet last
January, the American Embassy noted that the agriculture minister,
Asif Rahimi, “appears to be the only minister that was confirmed about
whom no allegations of bribery exist.”

One Afghan official helpfully explained to diplomats the “four stages”
at which his colleagues skimmed money from American development
projects: “When contractors bid on a project, at application for
building permits, during construction, and at the ribbon-cutting
ceremony.” In a seeming victory against corruption, Abdul Ahad
Sahibi, the mayor of Kabul, received a four-year prison sentence last
year for “massive embezzlement.” But a cable from the embassy told a
very different story: Mr. Sahibi was a victim of “kangaroo court
justice,” it said, in what appeared to be retribution for his attempt
to halt a corrupt land-distribution scheme.

It is hardly news that predatory corruption, fueled by a booming
illicit narcotics industry, is rampant at every level of Afghan
society. Transparency International, an advocacy organization that
tracks government corruption around the globe, ranks Afghanistan as
the world’s third most corrupt country, behind Somalia and Myanmar.

But the collection of confidential diplomatic cables obtained by
WikiLeaks and made available to a number of publications, offers a
fresh sense of its pervasive nature, its overwhelming scale, and the
dispiriting challenge it poses to American officials who have made
shoring up support for the Afghan government a cornerstone of
America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

The cables make it clear that American officials see the problem as
beginning at the top. An August 2009 report from Kabul complains that
President Hamid Karzai and his attorney general “allowed dangerous
individuals to go free or re-enter the battlefield without ever facing
an Afghan court.” The embassy was particularly concerned that Mr.
Karzai pardoned five border police officers caught with 124 kilograms
(about 273 pounds) of heroin and intervened in a drug case involving
the son of a wealthy supporter.

The American dilemma is perhaps best summed up in an October 2009
cable sent by Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, written after he met with
Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president’s half brother, the most powerful man
in Kandahar and someone many American officials believe prospers from
the drug trade. (Mr. Karzai denies any involvement with narcotics
trafficking.)

“The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major challenges in
Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and connect the people to their
government, when the key government officials are themselves corrupt,”
Ambassador Eikenberry wrote.

American officials seem to search in vain for an honest partner. A
November 2009 cable described the acting governor of Khost Province,
Tahir Khan Sabari, as “a refreshing change,” an effective and
trustworthy leader. But Mr. Sabari told his American admirers that he
did not have “the $200,000-300,000 for a bribe” necessary to secure
the job permanently.

Ahmed Zia Massoud held the post of first vice president from 2004 to
2009; the brother of the Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud,
he was discussed as a future president. Last year, a cable reported,
Mr. Massoud was caught by customs officials carrying $52 million in
unexplained cash into the United Arab Emirates.

A diplomatic cable is not a criminal indictment, of course, and in an
interview Mr. Massoud denied taking any money out of Afghanistan.
“It’s not true,” he said. “Fifty-two million dollars is a pile of
money as big as this room.” Yet while his official salary was a few
hundred dollars a month, he lives in a waterfront house on Palm
Jumeirah, a luxury Dubai community that is also home to other Afghan
officials. When a reporter visited the dwelling this year, a
Rolls-Royce was parked out front.

The cables describe a country where everything is for sale. The
Transportation Ministry collects $200 million a year in trucking fees,
but only $30 million is turned over to the government, according to a
2009 account to diplomats by Wahidullah Shahrani, then the commerce
minister. As a result, “individuals pay up to $250,000 for the post
heading the office in Herat, for example, and end up owning beautiful
mansions as well as making lucrative political donations,” said Mr.
Shahrani, who also identified 14 of Afghanistan’s governors as “bad
performers and/or corrupt.”

Then again, another cable reports “rumors” that Mr. Shahrani himself
“was involved in a corrupt oil import deal.” He denied the rumors,
saying that they were inventions by two rivals who were “among the
most corrupt in Afghanistan,” the cable said.

Pity the diplomat who must sort out whose version of reality to
believe. One cable reported the American ambassador’s attempt to size
up Mr. Shahrani, who later became the minister of mines. “Ambassador
Eikenberry noted Shahrani’s extravagant home, suggesting that the
Afghans knew best who is corrupt,” the cable said.

The cables lay out allegations of bribes and profit-skimming in the
organization of travel to Saudi Arabia for the hajj, or pilgrimage; in
a scheme to transfer money via cellphones; in the purchase of wheat
seed; in the compilation of an official list of war criminals; and in
the voting in Parliament.

Dr. Sayed Fatimie, the minister of health, told diplomats in January
that members of Parliament wanted cash to confirm his appointment.
“Expressing shock at the blatancy of these extortion attempts, Fatimie
said MPs had offered their own votes and the votes of others they
could purportedly deliver for $1,000 apiece,” a cable said.

The case of the Kabul mayor, Mr. Sahibi, shows how complicated it can
be to sort out corruption charges. A Jan. 7 cable signed by
Ambassador Eikenberry gave an account sharply at odds with media
reports, which treated the prosecution as a landmark in the campaign
for honest government.

The cable, referring to embassy interviews with Mr. Sahibi, said the
charges against him were based on a decision to lease a piece of city
property to shopkeepers. Three months after the lease was signed,
another bidder offered $16,000 more. The “loss” of the potential
additional revenue became the “massive embezzlement” described by
prosecutors, the cable said.

Mr. Sahibi told the Americans he had been summoned to appear in court
on Dec. 7 to be assigned a hearing date. Instead, he said, he was
given a four-year sentence and a $16,000 fine.

As for the motive behind his prosecution, Mr. Sahibi said that in less
than two years as mayor “he had found files for approximately 32,000
applicants who paid for nonexistent plots of land in Kabul.” He said
he halted the program and “invalidated the illegal claims of some
important people,” who took their revenge with the bogus criminal
case.

The embassy cable largely supported Mr. Sahibi’s version of events,
saying that the mayor’s “official decision may have antagonized
powerful people who then sought the power of the state to discredit
him.” Far from being a blow against corruption, the cable suggested,
the case was a travesty of justice.

The widespread corruption is made possible in part by a largely
unregulated banking infrastructure and the ancient hawala money
transfer network that is the method of choice for politicians,
insurgents, and drug traffickers to move cash around the Muslim world.

Last year, a cable signed by Ambassador Eikenberry said that the
hawala favored by the Afghan elite, New Ansari, “is facilitating
bribes and other wide-scale illicit cash transfers for corrupt Afghan
officials” and providing financial services to narco-traffickers
through front companies in Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates.
He asked Washington to send more investigators and wiretap analysts to
assist nascent Afghan task forces that were examining New Ansari.

The anticorruption task forces already faced significant obstacles.
For instance, Afghanistan’s interior minister asked that the American
government “take a low profile on the New Ansari case” to avoid the
perception that investigations were being carried out “at the behest
of the United States.”

Months later, when the New Ansari investigators carried out a predawn
raid on the house of a top aide to President Karzai whom investigators
heard soliciting a bribe on a wiretap, Mr. Karzai intervened to
release the man from jail and threatened to take control of the
anticorruption investigations. In November, the Afghan government
dropped all charges against the aide.

The resulting standoff between Kabul and Washington forced the Obama
administration to take stock of its strategy: was trying to root out
corruption, at the risk of further alienating Mr. Karzai, really worth
it? And with American troops set to begin leaving Afghanistan next
summer, and the American public having long ago lost the appetite for
nation-building, was trying to root out corruption a Sisyphean task?

In September, President Obama acknowledged the dilemma. “Are there
going to be occasions where we look and see that some of our folks on
the ground have made compromises with people who are known to have
engaged in corruption?” he asked. “There may be occasions where that
happens.”

A February cable described exactly such a compromise, reporting on a
police chief at a border crossing in southern Afghanistan, Col. Abdul
Razziq, who was reputed to be corrupt -- and good at his job.

Western officials, it said, “walk a thin tightrope when working with
this allegedly corrupt official who is also a major security
stabilizing force.”

--Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti reported from Washington, and Dexter
Filkins from Kabul, Afghanistan. Andrew W. Lehren contributed
reporting from New York.

2.

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: CAPITAL FLIGHT AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE STABILITY
[By Karl W. Eikenberry, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan]

[October 19, 2009]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09KABUL3364.html
or
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-view...

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TAGS EINV,EFIN, KTFN, PGOV, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: CAPITAL FLIGHT AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE STABILITY

REF: A. KABUL 2791 B. KABUL 3326

Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(S) SUMMARY: Afghanistan’s is a cash-based economy, relying on
historic trade linkages with neighboring and regional partners. Given
Afghanistan’s strategic location, ongoing conflict, and deep
involvement in illicit trade (e.g., narcotics), as well as some
neighboring country currency exchange policies, vast amounts of cash
come and go from the country on a weekly, monthly, and annual basis.
Before the August 20 election, $600 million in banking system
withdrawals were reported; however, in recent months, some $200
million has flowed back into the country. In terms of total money
leaving the country, analysts are uncertain whether it is generated
within Afghanistan or is moving through Afghanistan from other
countries such as Pakistan (Pakistan’s strict currency controls makes
smuggling through Kabul International Airport (KIA) an attractive
option). Experts also do not know the ratio of licit and illicit
monies leaving the country. Given Afghanistan’s general political
uncertainty, lack of credible and safe investment opportunities, and
unsettled election, it appears that individuals moved more money than
normal out of the Afghan banking sector and country as a hedge before
the elections. While some of the money appears to be returning,
Mission -- with support from Washington agencies and other posts in
the region -- will work to closely monitor the cash movements, both as
a sign of public confidence in GIRoA and for possible illicit
financial activities. End summary.

RECENT TRENDS -------------

¶2. (S) While reports vary widely, records obtained from Kabul
International Airport (KIA) support suspicions large amounts of
physical cash transit from Kabul to Dubai on a weekly, monthly, and
annual basis. According to confidential reports, more than $190
million left Kabul for Dubai through KIA during July, August, and
September. Actual amounts, however, could be much larger. An
official claiming first-hand knowledge recently told the Treasury
Attache some $75 million transited through KIA bound for Dubai in one
day during the month of July. The primary currencies identified at
the airport for these three months include (in declining order):
Saudi riyals, Euros, U.S. dollars, and UAE dirhams. Some Pakistani
rupees and British pounds were also declared, but in much smaller
amounts. Comparatively, in 2008, approximately $600 million was
declared at KIA and another 100 million Euros and 80 million British
pounds were declared bound for Dubai, according to available reports
compiled by the Central Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit. According
to our sources, established couriers primarily use Pamir Airlines,
which is owned by Kabul Bank and influential Afghans such as Mahmood
Karzai and Mohammad Fahim who is President Hamid Karzai’s current
vice-presidential running mate.

ONE FACTOR: ELECTION UNEASE ---------------------------

¶3. (S) In an October 7 meeting, Afghan Central Bank Governor Abdul
Qadeer Fitrat stressed there are no indications of significant capital
flight. He pointed to a stable exchange rate and increasing assets in
the formal financial system as supporting his perspective. Fitrat
also mentioned that the formal banking system is well capitalized and
the regulatory capital ratio of all banking institutions is above the
minimum threshold (12 percent of risk-weighted assets.) Nevertheless,
Fitrat did note the Central Bank was aware roughly $600 million had
left Afghanistan’s banking system before the elections, due, he said,
tainty [sic] as to the outcome of the election and the prospects for
the new government. Fitrat could not say what percentage of this
money actually left the country. (Note: Nor are there statistics
showing how much was withdrawn or transferred through the more
informal hawala network. End note.) As of October 7, more than $200
million has returned to the banking sector according to Fitrat. The
Central Bank Governor restated this figure in an October 13 meeting
between Fitrat and the Coordinating Director for Development and
Economic Affairs (ref B).

¶4. (C) Separately, and in the same timeframe as the meeting with
Fitrat, CEOs from several leading banks approached the Treasury
Attache with concerns over significant cash withdrawals and wire
transfers to other accounts in Dubai and Europe. In separate meetings
October 12, several bankers reported deposits are growing and appeared
positive about future prospects. However, the various bankers noted
widespread uncertainty about the ongoing election process and overall
security situation will likely continue to spook Afghanistan’s
existing and potential investors, and as a result, undermine growth.
One experienced banker flatly said no legitimate business person would
keep significant sums of money in Afghanistan right now given the
overwhelming risks of doing so.

KABUL 00003364 002 OF 002

ILLICIT VERSUS LICIT --------------------

¶5. (C) Taking capital out of Afghanistan (physically through cash or
value or by using wire transfer) is not illegal, as long as it is
declared. For example, formal financial flows (e.g., wire transfers)
over $10,000 are recorded by banks and submitted to the Central Bank’s
Financial Intelligence Unit for analysis. All 17 licensed banks
submit these reports on a monthly basis. Similarly, cash couriers
transiting KIA or crossing the land border must declare carried cash
if it exceeds $20,000. This regulation is better enforced at KIA than
along Afghanistan’s porous borders, which further complicates
full-understanding of this already complex problem-set.

¶6. (S) While it is impossible to know for sure at this point, our
sense is the money leaving Afghanistan is likely a combination of
illicit and licit proceeds. Drug traffickers, corrupt officials, and
to a large extent licit business owners do not benefit from keeping
millions of dollars in Afghanistan and instead are motivated (due to
risk and return-on-investment) to move value into accounts and
investments outside of Afghanistan. For example, the United Arab
Emirates government revealed, as part of an ongoing Drug Enforcement
Administration/Afghan Threat Finance Cell investigation, that it had
stopped Afghan Vice-President Ahmad Zia Masood entering the country
with $52 million earlier this year -- a significant amount he was
ultimately allowed to keep without revealing the money’s origin or
destination. Moreover, Sher Khan Farnood, the Chairman of Kabul Bank,
reportedly owns 39 properties on the Palm Jumeirah in Dubai and has
other financial interests spread widely beyond Afghanistan. (Note:
Many other notable private individuals and public officials maintain
assets (primarily property) outside Afghanistan, suggesting these
individuals are extracting as much wealth as possible while conditions
permit. End note.)

COMMENT -------

¶7. (S) The sense among Mission elements is that significant volumes
of cash leave Afghanistan through wire transfers, the hawala network,
and physically through the airport. We do not know, however, whether
this money is generated within Afghanistan or brought in from other
countries such as Pakistan for transfer (Pakistan strictly enforces
currency controls, making smuggling through KIA an attractive option.)
We also do not know the ratio of licit and illicit monies leaving the
country (with the former more likely to return at some point.) Given
Afghanistan’s general political uncertainty, lack of credible and safe
investment opportunities, and unsettled election, we are inclined to
believe several individuals moved more money than normal out of the
Afghan banking sector and country as a measure of protection before
the elections. We will continue to monitor and engage on the issue
here. However, input from Washington agencies as well as from other
missions in the region will be key in developing a clearer
understanding of the composition, size, and directions of these cash
flows. End comment.

EIKENBERRY

3.

POWERBROKER AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN SPIN BOLDAK

[February 7, 2010]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10KABUL467.html
or
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-view...

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2020
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: POWERBROKER AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN SPIN BOLDAK

REF: A. (A) KABUL 463
¶B. (B) KABUL 408
¶C. (C) 09 KABUL 4039
¶D. (D) 09 KABUL 4024

KABUL 00000467 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Spin Boldak District in Kandahar Province and its
major border crossing point to Pakistan at Weech-Chaman have become
the focus of a number of high profile coalition efforts given the
upcoming military operations in Regional Command-South (RC-S).
Although there is a high potential for large scale revenue collections
through customs collected at the border, the lack of a strong, capable
district government has allowed powerbrokers, especially Afghan Border
Police (ABP) Chief Colonel Abdul Razzik, to fill the void. Accused
constantly of illegal trafficking and taxing activities through
Weech-Chaman (most recently by a January 19 *Washington Post* article
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/18/AR2010011803474.html]),
Razzik has been careful to maintain a cooperative relationship with
the ISAF leadership to guard his position. ISAF and USG interlocutors
walk a thin tightrope when working with this allegedly corrupt
official who is also a major security stabilizing force. Despite
Razzik's power and influence in Spin Boldak, we will press the GIRoA
to establish and empower competent district governance to
counterbalance the powerbrokers and make Spin Boldak a profitable
customs hub within southern Afghanistan. As one of the 80 terrain
districts, we expect it to ultimately become a focus of enhanced
capacity building through the District Delivery Program (DDP). End
summary.

HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION --------------------

¶2. (C) Reflecting the importance of Spin Boldak District to the
coalition effort, particularly in light of the military surge in the
South, COMISAF and the RC-South Commander visited the Weech border
crossing point on January 18, arriving in Afghanistan from the
Pakistan side of the border along with the head of the Pakistani
Frontier Corps. The goal of their visit was to engage Afghan
authorities on issues related to border security, including
cooperation between the neighboring countries and ISAF convoy traffic.
Unlike the Pakistani and ISAF delegations, which were comprised of
high-level commanding officers, the Afghan contingent was led by
Colonel Abdul Razzik, Fourth Zone Chief of the Afghan Border Police
(ABP) responsible for Spin Boldak and local powerbroker, accompanied
by the weak District Governor, Haji Abdul Ghani. No higher level
Afghan officials, political or military, were in attendance, a sign of
Razzik's apparent unquestioned -- but also unaccountable -- authority
over issues pertaining to Spin Boldak and its environs.

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS ---------------------

¶3. (C) Razzik's apparent autonomy and connections to many influential
officials, including President Karzai (through former Helmand governor
Assadullah Wafa, an Achekzai kinsmen and the president's adviser on
tribal affairs) and former Kandahar governor and mentor Gul Agha
Sherzai leave him well positioned to maintain power and influence in
the district. Additionally, he has been amenable to many of the
requests made of him by ISAF, including allowing his troops to partner
with coalition forces. Requests to which he has acquiesced include
support for interim improvements planned at the border crossing point
intended to both expedite the increase in ISAF convoys and lay the
groundwork for more efficient customs generation. The January 18
COMISAF visit underscored Razzik's key enabling role in this regard,
and his calculated approach to working with ISAF.

¶4. (C) To this end, Razzik is not obstructing coalition requirements
at the border (or throughout the district) though his longstanding
disapproval of a visible ISAF presence in and around the crossing
point during daylight hours is well known. (Note: Razzik tells ISAF
that the reason for this is that the troops would become targets and
result in civilian casualties. However, daylight is also the time of
day when commercial traffic and money-making opportunities are at
their peak. End note.) He knows that to reject coalition requests
would be to engender unwanted ill will by ISAF and, in the near term,
there is money to be made in labor and materials at the border and
further up Highway 4 where ISAF plans to build a staging area for
convoys on land near Razzik's compound and owned by his associate. A
January

KABUL 00000467 002.2 OF 003

18 meeting with MG Riley of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides
an insight into his personal calculations: Razzik's main talking
point was concern that trucks providing materials to ISAF in Spin
Boldak were not locally-owned. It is probably not a coincidence that
he himself owns a locally-based trucking fleet.

ABETTING THE STAUS QUO -----------------------

¶5. (C) Contrary to the prevailing narrative of Razzik's unchallenged
authority in Spin Boldak, anecdotal evidence paints a picture of less
than harmonious dynamics within Razzik's own Achekzai tribe with
regard to the Colonel's prominence. Razzik's immediate predecessor in
the ABP, Haji Fida Mohammad (a member of the Tribal Shura and District
Development Assembly) does not hide his contempt in public for his
nephew. One local account suggests that Razzik did not achieve his
position through a tribal consensus but that he was thrust upon Spin
Boldak by GIRoA, a view bolstered by the Colonel's reported links to
former Governor Sherzai.

DISTRICT GOVERNANCE -------------------

¶6. (C) At present, the District Government of Spin Boldak is presided
over by Haji Abdul Ghani, a Popalzai tribesman and Karzai kinsman.
The third District Governor (DG) in two years, Abdul Ghani's
predecessor reportedly was removed for offending local sensibilities
by pledging to tackle corruption. Abdul Ghani functions in an
"acting" capacity, and recently requested coalition assistance to
press Kabul to make his appointment permanent. The DG asserts that
resolving his status will give him the necessary clout to properly
address development needs and tackle corruption. However, the DST's
experience to date with the DG does not instill confidence that this
is all that is required to improve governance. A broader effort to
empower local authority and fill civil service vacancies will be
essential to strengthening local governance and reducing the
unfettered role of local power brokers in the area. (Note: Reported
to have little more than a fourth grade education, DG Abdul Ghani has
demonstrated to the DST that what he may lack in managerial capacity
he may make up for in other useful character traits. In a November
shura in the village of Luy Karez, the DG challenged village elders,
support of the Taliban. As reported in reftel A, the local ABP
commander similarly confronted elders in the same shura only to be
assassinated soon afterwards. End note.)

¶7. (C) The other pillar of district governance is a two-headed Tribal
Shura-District Development Assembly (Shura/DDA), dominated in equal
measures by the Noorzai and Achekzai tribes and their most assertive
local leaders. Functioning as private clubs, the bodies primarily
ensure that donor funds are monopolized by a select group of Spin
Boldak notables. The cooperation of the district's two main tribes
within this context belie the argument that Razzik's mediation has
averted inter-tribal conflict. As Haji Fida Mohammad told the DST in
the company of fellow Achekzai and Noorzai Shura/DDA members, "there
are some who don't want the tribes to get along," referring to his
relative, the ABP chief. Without an empowered District Government,
however, there is little check on the self-serving actions of these
institutions, which ultimately undermines equitable distribution of
development resources in Spin Boldak.

DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT --------------------

¶8. (SBU) One consequence of the interests and arrangements
underpinning district security is the limited reach of development
outside of Spin Boldak center (reftel A). While security, or lack
thereof, contributes to the precarious state of many communities in
the areas north and south of Highway 4, district government staffing
deficiencies and the absence of permanent representatives from
ministries critical to district development -- specifically within the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) -- equally hamper
progress. Not receiving the services they need or the attention they
deserve from the government, citizens outside the Highway 4 corridor,
particularly in Noorzai tribal areas, do not see themselves as
stakeholders in the district's development and thus are more
susceptible to intimidation and insurgent propaganda. Razzik
regularly spins [N.B. Eikenberry seems to be making a pun. --J.O.M.]
this potential for the spread of this instability to his advantage in
his dealings with the coalition.

KABUL 00000467 003 OF 003

¶9. (SBU) A number of initiatives are underway to remedy the
developmental needs of the District and the alienation of its
residents. USAID's Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production of
Agriculture Plus (AVIPA Plus) program, for example, has the potential
to play an important role in revitalizing the current state of
agriculture in Spin Boldak and, thereby transform perceptions of
GIRoA. A key component in realizing these end states will be the
involvement of empowered local government officials beyond Razziq and
the Shura/DDA to enable equitable distribution of resources -- a
dynamic that does not currently exist in the district.

COMMENT -------

¶10. (C) Colonel Razzik's alleged involvement in the District's
illicit trafficking and illegal taxation on transit trade has been
widely reported (most recently in a January 19 Washington Post
article). His presence, however, need not forestall Spin Boldak's
progress nor should it be an accepted excuse for continued neglect and
underdevelopment in the district. By accepting the view that Razzik
is both the guarantor of district security and the lynchpin in tribal
power relations, we potentially are overlooking steps which could be
taken in the near term to improve the overall state of governance and
development in the district, short of removing Razzik. Additionally,
by ascribing unaccountable authority to Razzik, the coalition
unintentionally reinforces his position through its direct and
near-exclusive dealings with him on all major issues in Spin Boldak.

¶11. (C) As a first step in remedying the current imbalance of power
between Razzik and other GIRoA authorities, a public and visible
commitment by GIRoA to the district's citizens is required.
Attracting competent civil servants from key ministries should be a
first step. Spin Boldak is among the 80 key terrain districts and
likely will be targeted for the District Delivery Program (DDP) by the
end of 2010. We will need to carefully manage eventual implementation
of the DDP to emplace empowered, competent government personnel and
the full complement of line ministry representatives and their
respective resources. A carefully managed approach to support the
growth of a functioning district government can lay an important
foundation for improved governance with or without Razzik.

¶12. (U) This message was drafted at the DST in Spin Boldak and in Kabul.

Eikenberry

4.

A TALE OF TWO KABUL MAYORS

[January 7, 2010]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10KABUL62.html
or
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-view...

VZCZCXRO3557
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0062/01 0071320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (ADX08F306 MSI7676 532A)
O 071320Z JAN 10 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4590
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000062

C O R R E C T E D COPY (HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS)

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: FBI JUS PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: A TALE OF TWO KABUL MAYORS

REF: 09 KABUL 4066

KABUL 00000062 001.4 OF 002

Classified By: Polcouns Annie Pforzheimer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. Summary: (C) President Karzai has appointed a new mayor of
Kabul, Engineer Mohammad Yunos Novandish. This follows the December
7, 2009, 'mismanagement of authority' conviction and the December 8,
2009, release pending appeal of former Kabul Mayor Abdul Ahad Sahebi
(Reftel.) The Novandish appointment portends controversy because he
is not from Kabul; the Sahebi case suggests kangaroo court justice.
Bio information on Novandish is in paras 3 and 4. End Summary.

--------------------
NEW MAYOR -- OLD TIES
--------------------

¶2. (C) President Karzai issued a January 3 decree appointing
Engineer Mohammad Yunos Novandish the new mayor of Kabul. Controversy
over the appointment may arise for two reasons: First, according to
Article 141 of the Constitution, mayors shall be elected, not
appointed. Some Afghan MPs went on TOLO TV January 5 to challenge the
appointment on constitutional grounds. Second, according to embassy
contacts among the National Democratic Front (NDF), Mayor Novandish
is not a native Kabuli and the NDF is planning to try and organize
protests within the month. (Note: The NDF is a loosely organized
coalition of urban civil society groups and members of parliament.)

¶3. (U) According to media reports and embassy contacts, Novandish,
an Uzbek from Saripol, graduated from the engineering faculty of Kabul
Polytechnic University in civil engineering and did post-graduate
studies in the Ukraine. He served as a lecturer at Balkh University
from 1994 to 1996, lived primarily in Central Asia during the Taliban
years, and was Deputy Minister of Water and Energy from 2004-2006.
Novandish resigned his post when Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of
Water and Energy. After 2006 he worked as a consultant for
USAID-funded programs such as International Development Relief and
Development, Inc. (IRD) and Advanced Engineering Institute Associates
(AEIA). In 2009 he opened his own engineering firm, Energy and Power
Construction Company, which has allegedly done extensive
subcontracting work in the energy sector. (Note: alternate
transliterations of his name include Noandesh, Novandesh, and
Nawandaish.)

¶4. (S/NF) Sensitive reporting indicates that warlord and leader of
the Junbesh Party General Dostum pushed Novandish for the Kabul Mayor
appointment. Although Novandish claims publicly that he is
politically independent, this reported Dostum support has credibility
given that Novandish was Deputy Minister of Water and Energy when
current MP and Junbesh Party member Shakar Kargar (Uzbek, Jowzjan) was
Minister. Kargar reportedly owed his own ministerial appointment at
that time to Dostum. Although Kargar is an intra-party rival of
Dostum, they often unite to further party interests. Dostum has been
publicly vocal in his criticism of the January 2 ministerial
confirmation process In which all three Junbesh nominees were
rejected. The appointment of an apparent Dostum supporter to the
mayor's office may well be President Karzai's attempt to placate
Dostum and Junbesh.

---------------------------
OLD MAYOR -- YESTERDAY'S NEWS
----------------------------

¶5. (C) Media coverage of the new mayor's appointment has included
condemnation of his predecessor, Abdul Ahad Sahebi, for "massive
embezzlement of funds and brazen misuse of authority." The ex-mayor's
December 7 conviction and almost immediate release from jail on bail
pending appeal generated a media frenzy and intense speculation over
President Karzai's role in Sahebi's release. (Reftel.) USG officials
met with Sahebi on December 25, 2009 and January 2 and 3, ¶2010.
Sahebi produced the December 6 summons he received to appear at
primary court and obtain a date for his preliminary hearing. Sahebi
contended that normal procedure requires a minimum of 5 days between
summons and hearing date, but when he presented himself to the court
on December 7, his lawyer was handed not a hearing date, but his
sentence -- four years in jail and a USD 16,000 fine.

¶6. (C) Concerning the actual charge of poor oversight of
contracting authority, Sahebi laid out his version of the case: In
2007 Sahebi's predecessor signed a one-year contract leasing some city
property to two individuals who had shops on the site. When the
contract came up for renewal, the City Hall financial department
assigned three people to study the continued use of the land. The
financial department recommended the contract be renewed, with mention
of the city's future plans for the site. Sahebi's deputy

KABUL 00000062 002.2 OF 002

signed the renewal. Three months later, a higher bid for the site
came in. Had that bid been accepted, the city would have gained about
USD 16,000 more for the lease and this "loss" was the basis of the
case against him. Embassy officials have not been privy to the
prosecution's case against Sahebi.
¶7. (C) Regarding his job perfomance, Sahebi also mentioned to USG
officials that in his less than two years as mayor he had found files
for approximately 32,000 applicants who paid for non-existent plots of
land in Kabul city. He said he ordered a halt to the distribution of
residential and commercial land until claims could be sorted out and
invalidated the illegal claims of some important people like Engineer
Ahmed Shah, who is close to the fundamentalist former warlord MP,
Rasoul Sayyaf (Pashtun, Kabul). This claim supports information
reported reftel that some of Sahebi's official decisions may have
antagonized powerful people who then sought to use the power of the
state to discredit him.

------------------------------
KARZAI'S MOTIVES STILL UNCLEAR
------------------------------

¶8. (C) Comment: Metaphorically speaking (there is no jury trial in
Afghanistan) the jury is still out on Sahebi, the first high-profile
case of official corruption following Karzai's re-election. Sahebi's
case is on appeal, but no
hearing date has been set. Unfortunately for the former mayor, he has
already been tried in the press and condemned as an embezzler, a
charge that apparently was not even brought and for which we have seen
no evidence. As for the formal process itself, it appears that Sahebi
may have been convicted without having been accorded what little due
process there is under Afghan law.

¶9. (C) The Novandish appointment may indicate that Karzai
concluded, despite his initial forceful defense of Sahebi, that it was
more politically expedient to sacrifice him. Karzai may hope both to
satisfy international expectations that he will act to clean up his
government and at the same time to placate powerful Afghan players who
wanted the ex-mayor gone for their own mercenary reasons. End
Comment.

EIKENBERRY

5.

AFGHAN COMMERCE MINISTER DISCUSSES REFORM AGENDA
[By Karl Eikenberry]

[November 18, 2009]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09KABUL3714.html
or
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-view...

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DE RUEHBUL #3714/01 3221518
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R 181518Z NOV 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3271

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 003714

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT)

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/SRAP AND SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHAN COMMERCE MINISTER DISCUSSES REFORM AGENDA

Classified by Coordinating Director for Development and Economic
Affairs Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C//NF) SUMMARY: Reform-minded Afghan Commerce Minister Shahrani,
who hopes for U.S. support to keep a ministerial job, argued on
November 15 that President Karzai is under heavy pressure from Afghan
politicians to accept less than ideal ministers and urged that the US
and other donors talk not only to Karzai but also to those politicians
to stress the importance of approving a good slate. Sharani also
shared his view of reforms needed in the new government, insights into
fighting corruption, views on the importance of getting sub-national
governance right, and the need for the government and donors to agree
on specific performance benchmarks tied to aid delivery. End Summary.

¶2. (C//NF) Afghan Commerce Minister Shahrani told Coordinating
Director for Development and Economic Affairs Wayne on November 15
that President Karzai is under great pressure from political leaders
to accept a number of ministerial candidates whose technical skills
are lacking. He specifically cited pressure from ex-warlord General
Dostum, from ex-jihadist Professor Sayyaf and Hazara leader Mohaqqeq.
Shahrani, who wants U.S. support to stay on in the cabinet, expressed
concern that Karzai would not resist the pressure for political
payback on his own, and urged the U.S. and other donors to communicate
directly with these political groupings to indicate that if a weak or
corrupt set of ministers was put in place then the U.S. and others
would be forced to withdraw their support. He argued that these
political leaders are only thinking of dividing up the spoils rather
than the quality of government needed to tackle Afghanistan's
problems. Shahrani repeatedly argued that the next five years are
essential for Afghanistan and the first months of the new Karzai
administration are key to getting the right reforms in place to really
bring about positive change in the years ahead. Afghanistan needs the
U.S. and other donors to have a chance for real progress, he said. He
urged that the U.S. speak frankly in private to Karzai as well as key
Afghan political leaders.

¶3. (SBU) Shahrani argued that it is essential that the U.S. and other
international donors get as many specific commitments as possible from
Karzai, in the inaugural speech if possible and subsequently then in
some sort of joint document between donors and Afghanistan. A key step
is to press for the President to be clear on basic commitments in his
inaugural speech, especially about good governance and fighting
corruption. Shahrani said he hoped the President would approve up to
ten key areas for reform in the first year of his administration. He
and Finance Minister Zakhilwal agree, according to Sharani, that the
reform areas should be in areas where the population will see a
difference in delivery of services.

¶4. (C//NF) Shahrani underscored the need for very good ministerial
and gubernatorial appointments and the concomitant reform of
government organizations. He said that he and other reform-minded
ministers still believe they have Karzai's support to name lead
ministers for five key clusters: 1) finance, economy and commerce; 2)
agriculture and rural Development; 3) human development (education and
health); 4) security; and 5) justice/rule of law. Cleaning up the last
sector will be essential, he argued, especially given the degree of
corruption currently in the Attorney General's ministry and the
judicial system. If this does not happen, it will be very hard to
address corruption in the rest of the government. Similarly, the
executive office of the President needs serious reorganization so the
President gets a good and balanced flow of information and advice and
so that ministerial coordination and cabinet decision-making can be
significantly enhanced, Sharani said. (Note: This is a complaint we
have heard from a wide variety of sources, from donor nations to
Palace insiders. End note.)

¶5. (C//NF) Turning to corruption more broadly, Shahrani argued that
State-owned enterprises need to be turned into independent commercial
entities rapidly (on the way to privatization), as they are great
sources of corruption. Shahrani also singled out the Transportation
Ministry as a hot bed of corruption, especially its airport operations
and its "private enterprise group." Finance Minister Zakhilwal had
recently broken up a corruption ring at Kabul Airport, but the private
sector group is an even bigger problem. This unit includes people who
collect fees on trucks traveling in Afghanistan. Estimates are that
about $200 million are collected yearly but only $30 million are
turned over to the government, he said. Individuals pay up to
$250,000 for the post heading this office in Herat, for example, and
end up owning beautiful mansions as well as making lucrative political
donations. This ministry should be a top target for cleaning up in
the new regime.

¶6. (SBU) In his November 15 conversation with Ambassador Wayne,
Shahrani said, 14 of Afghanistan's governors have been identified by
Local Governance minister Popal as bad performers and/or corrupt.
These 14 should be fired, and the new government should implement
procedures for selecting governors based on merit and for reviewing
performance on a yearly basis. Such a performance review process
should be put in place for all top officials. There must also be a
greater focus on improving service delivery at the provincial level,
he argued. Governors should be given more substantial operational
budgets as well as placed under more rigorous auditing controls. The
big municipalities also need careful attention, first in good mayoral
appointments and then in greatly improved management, tax collection
and service delivery.

¶7. (C//NF) Turning to international assistance, Shahrani argued that
donors should tie additional aid to clear benchmarks and timelines.
This should be publically announced as part of a broader agreement,
and donors should be tough in demanding agreed performance benchmarks
before distributing additional assistance. Such an agreement should
call for some overarching commitments, with each ministry receiving
aid committed to achieving its own set of benchmarks in consultations
with donors. There should be focus on improving delivery of services
to the population and mechanisms should be put in place to measure
success. Shahrani suggested that the action plans for ministries
should have three to four year time horizons.

¶8. (C//NF) Comment: Minister Shahrani is working closely with the
Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Education and local government to
encourage bold reform moves by the new Karzai administration. While
some of the specific ideas he shared may be his own, they are
consistent with what other reform-minded ministers have been saying
and urging. Shahrani clearly hopes for U.S. support in keeping a
cabinet position. He has been a good partner on a range of commercial
and economic issues and an energetic proponent of reaching a trade
agreement with Pakistan. He has also gone out of his way to help on
bilateral issues such as finalizing arrangements for U.S. Consulate
leases.

EIKENBERRY

6.

FOLLOW-UP REQUEST -- RESOURCING EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE THE NEW ANSARI
HAWALA NETWORK AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING THREATS

[October 18, 2010]

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09KABUL3324.html
or
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-view...

VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHBUL #3324 2910721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 180721Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2233
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0916
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8023
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2002

S E C R E T KABUL 003324

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SRAP, S/SCT, EEB, SCA/RA, and SCA/A
DEPT PASS AID/ASIA BUREAU
TREASURY FOR A/S DAVID COHEN and TFFC -- BRIAN GRANT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS: EFIN EINV KTFN PREL AF
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REQUEST -- RESOURCING EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE THE NEW
ANSARI HAWALA NETWORK AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING THREATS

REF: KABUL 2791

Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) As discussed in reftel, information strongly suggests
Afghanistan's New Ansari hawala network is facilitating bribes and
other wide-scale illicit cash transfers for corrupt Afghan officials
and is providing illicit financial services for narco-traffickers,
insurgents, and criminals through an array of front companies in
Afghanistan and the UAE.

¶2. (S) Headquartered in Kabul, the New Ansari hawala network has
connections to Dubai and other global financial markets. Law
enforcement and other components in Mission Afghanistan and ISAF have
been investigating New Ansari and briefed Washington agencies in a
September 8 SVTC. As noted in ref, moving forward against New Ansari
requires an interagency approach here in country as well as in
Washington. Such efforts will need to include better organizing and
resourcing USG efforts to identify and disrupt financial linkages in
Afghanistan and in key regional financial hubs.

¶3. (S) Embassy would appreciate a response to the requests for
additional resources/support contained in reftel. These include the
need to fully staff the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) -- the total
number of positions required is 49, but only 22 of those positions are
filled. Moreover, a higher percentage of those slots should be filled
with more senior and experienced interagency analysts and at least one
public corruption prosecutor. The ATFC also urgently requires access
to translators who can accurately and quickly process an increasing
amount of wire intercept information, including complex technical and
financial records. In addition, the current split in the ATFC
between Bagram Airfield and Kabul should be minimized. To integrate
the ATFC better into broader intelligence analysis efforts, it would
be advisable to establish a lead base of operations in Kabul. The
ATFC would continue to forward deploy liaison staff at each regional
command to ensure country-wide coverage.

¶4. (C) Mission appreciates Washington agencies' consideration and
support of these requests. We look forward to a rapid response.

EIKENBERRY